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DEPARTMENT NOTES.
Election of Professor Mikell, December 2, 1902.-William E.
Mikell, assistant professor in the Law Department of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania from 1899 to 1902, has been appointed
a full professor in the department. Born in Sumter, South
Carolina, to which state his ancestors came from England in
1682, Mr. Mikell was educated in the South. He was graduated
from the Military Department of the University of South Caro-
lina in 1890, with the degree of Bachelor of Science, afterwards
taking a special course in law at the University of Virginia,
under the eminent John B. Minor. In 1894 he was admitted to
the bar of South Carolina, but two years afterwards came to
Philadelphia and engaged in legal work. In 1897 he was ap-
pointed instructor in law. Since that time he has devoted him-
self entirely to his work in the Law School. In 1899 he was
appointed assistant professor and took charge of the courses in
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Criminal Law and Blackstone's Commentaries. In 1902 he was
given charge of the course on Contracts of the second year. Mr.
Mikell has recently published the first part of a compilation of
Cases in Criminal Law; the second part is now being issued.
Resignation of Professor Carson, March 3, 1903.-Hampton
L. Carson, LL. D., resigned his professorship March 3, 1903; he
having accepted in January the appointment as attorney-general
of the state of Pennsylvania. Mr. Carson was elected professor
of law in 1895. From the fall of 1896 until the spring of 1900
he conducted the courses in Contracts. At this time the increas-
ing pressure of his private practice compelled him to ask for a
leave of absence. This was granted in the expectation that he
would be able to return and take up his duties in the depart-
ment. His appointment as attorney-general prevented the ful-
fillment of this expectation. His resignation was, therefore, ac-
cepted by the trustees, with expressions of regret and also with
congratulations on his appointment.
Mr. Carson was born in Philadelphia about fifty years ago.
He was educated in this city, being graduated from the College
and the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania. He
immediately entered into the active practice of his profession-and
soon became well known for his ability as a lawyer and his elo-
quence as an orator. He has had a most varied practice, crimi-
nal as well as civil. For many years he was an active member of
the law firm of Jones, Carson & Beeber. He is the author of the
well known "History of the Supreme Court of the United
States," and has also made many valuable contributions to the
periodical literature of the law, notably the articles which have
appeared from time to time in the pages of this review.
As an orator Mr. Carson has long been eminent, and has been
called upon for addresses not only upon legal topics, but on occa-
sions of historical and social importance. He has delivered
addresses before many bar associations, and at college com-
mencements. At Lafayette College, where he delivered the com-
mencement oration in 1898, the degree of LL. D. was conferred
upon him.
At the opening of the Law School Building in 1900 he deliv-
ered the dedicatory oration for Price Hall. He has been a most
generous friend to the Biddle Library, to which he has donated
a large number of valuable books.
RAILROADS-REGULATION BY STATE-ABROGATION OF COM-
MON-LAW IRULE AS TO FELLOW SERVANTS--VALIDITY OF CON-
TRACT EXEMPTING FROM LIABILITY UNDER IOWA STATUTE.-
O'Brien v. Chicago & N. W. By. Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 502 (Cir-
cuit Court, N. D. Iowa, C. D. June, 1902). This is a case decided
under Sections 2071 and 2074 of the Iowa State Code and Chap-
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ter 49 of the Acts of the 29th General Assembly, Section 2071,
headed, "Liability for Negligence or Wrongs of Employes,"
which provides substantially, that every corporation operating a
railway in the state of Iowa shall be liable for damages sus-
tained by any person, including employes, and "no contract
which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding."
Section 2074, headed, "Contract or Rule Limiting Liability,"
provides substantially that no contract shall exempt any railway
company from the liability which would exist had no contract
been entered into.
Chapter 49 of the Acts of the 27th General Assembly amends
Section 2071 of the Code by adding the provision that no con-
tract of indemnity entered into prior to the injury, between the
person injured and such corporation, shall constitute a bar to an
action brought under the provisions of this section.
This action was brought by the personal representative of an
"express messenger" killed in an accident brought about through
the negligence of the defendant company's employes. Upon
entering the employ of the express company the deceased had
signed an agreement exonerating the company from liability for
any injuries which might be sustained by him while in the employ
of the company. By virtue of the contract between the express
company and the railway company, this agreement had accrued
to the benefit of the defendant company.
Upon demurrer the question arises whether this agreement is
a legal bar to the right of action declared on by plaintiff, and, in
view of these legislative enactments, it was held by Judge Shiras,
judge of the 8th U. S. Circuit, Northern District of Iowa, that
it was not.
The case is important as deciding: (1) The right of a state
through whose legislative consent alone a railroad company
derives the right to construct and operate a railroad within its
territory, to attach to such consent conditions for the protection
of the lives of its citizens, though employes of the railroad, and
as one of such conditions, to abrogate as to railway compa-
nies, by a general law applicable to all companies operating roads
within the state, the common law rule which exempts a master
from liability for injuries resulting from negligence of fellow ser-
vants.
(2) The validity of a contract exempting from such liability
under the Iowa statute.
On the authority of Railway Co. v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498,
1900, it is settled that one occupying the position of an express
messenger, under the circumstances surrounding deceased at the
time of his death, cannot be considered a passenger, but occu-
pies the position of an employe of the railway company. In
this case it was said: "That the relation of the express messenger
to the transportation company . . . seems to us to more
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resemble that of an employe than that of a passenger. His posi-
tion is one created by an agreement between the express company
and the railroad company, adjusting the terms of a joint business,
the transportation and delivery of express matter. His duties of
personal control and custody of the packages, if not performed by
an express messenger, would have to be performed by one in the
immediate service of the railroad company. And, of course, if
his position was that of a common employe of both companies,
he could not recover for injuries caused, as would appear to have
been the present case, by the negligence of fellow servants." The
question therefore turns upon the operation of the statute. In
his opinion Judge Shiras says: "The right to conduct and oper-
ate a railroad by the agency of steam in the state of Iowa is
derived from the legislation of the state, and in conferring this
right and providing for the mode of its exercise, the state has the
right to make such provisions as it deems best to secure the safety
of the life and limbs of those who may be subject to risk through
the operation of the railways of the state." This right has been
frequently recognized by the legislatures of other states and their
statutes have been similarly interpreted by the courts. Coley v.
North Carolina Railway Co., 40 S. E. 195, 1901; Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Macksey (Kan.) 127 U. S. 205, 1887;
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Herrick (Iowa), 127
U. S. 210, 1887; Chicago, Kansas & Western Railroad Co. v.
Pontius (Kan.), 157 _U. S. 209, 1894. These cases thoroughly
discuss the constitutionality of such statutes and decide it in
the affirmative. In Railroad Co. v. Mackey (supra), the court
said: "But the hazardous character of the business of operating a
railway would seem to call for special legislation with respect to
railroad corporations, having for its object the protection of their
employes as well as the safety of the public. The business of
other corporations is not subject to similar dangers to their
employes, and no objection therefore can be made to the legis-
lation on the ground of its making an unjust discrimination.
It meets- a particular need, and all railroad corporations are,
without distinction, made subject to the same liabilities."
In another part of the same decision it is said: "When legis-
lation applies to particular bodies or associations a law imposing
upon them additional liabilities, is not open to the objection
that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all per-
sons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same
circumstances.' Rights and privileges arising from contracts
with a state are subject to regulations for the protection of the
public health, public morals and public safety, in the same sense
as are all contracts, and all property, whether owned by natural
persons or by corporations: St. Louis & San Francisco Ry v.
Mathews, 165 UG. S. 1, 1896; Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall
36, 1872; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 1878; New
NOTES.
Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Jo., 115 U. S. 650, 1885;
New Orleans Waterworks v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 1885. The
power of a state to so regulate contracts of this nature is not
questioned. The state, for the protection of the property of its
citizens, having the right to impose upon railway companies lia-
bility for injury to such property resulting from the operation of
their trains, it would seem that certainly it must have the right to
throw a like protection around the life and limb of its citizens.
The rule of the common law, as it is said in Hough v. Railway
Co., 100 U. S. 213, 1879, is based upon the proposition that,
"it is implied in the contract between the parties that the ser-
vant risks the dangers which ordinarily attend or are incident
to the business in which he voluntarily engages for compensa-
tion; among which is the carelessness of those at least in the
same work or employment, with whose habits, conduct and capac-
ity he has in the course of his duties an opportunity to become
acquainted, and against whose negligence or incompetency he
may himself take such precautions as his inclination or judg-
ment may suggest." This rule of common law was formulated
in connection with the ordinary business vocations of life, long
prior to the introduction of railroads and their extensive and
complicated systems of employment; when from personal contact
with his fellow employes, an employe had a better opportunity
to judge their competency and carefulness than was possessed by
the master; and such employe had an opportunity to protect
himself against the dangers resulting from their carelessness,
either by complaint to the master or by taking the precautions
rendered necessary by the actions of his co-employes. For these
reasons the rule is perfectly just when applied to the ordinary
employments out of which it had its birth. But when the
employe is one of thousands, most of whom he has never seen, and
where he can have no opportunity to judge of their competency
and carefulness, when the slightest act of negligence of a fellow
employe may put his life in jeopardy, as is the case in a great
modern railway system, the reasons which were the cause of the
common law rule can hardly be said to apply.
We come now to an examination of the contract exempting
the railroad company from all liability under the Iowa statute.
Judge Shiras says: "The Supreme Court in the Voight case
(supra), held that such messengers were not passengers upon the
railway trains, but rather occupied the position of employes of
both companies. If such is their legal position, then, being an
employe of the railway company, the messenger clearly comes
within the spirit as well as the language of Section 2071, and
the railway company is made liable to him for the consequence
of the neglect or mismanagement of the employes of the company
in the operation of the railway." In Coley v. North Carolina
Railway Co. (supra), the court said: "It is well settled that the
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doctrine of fellow servants and assumption of risk rests entirely
upon an implied contract; and if an express contract could be
made to take the place of the implied contract the essential pur-
pose of the act could be defeated."
In most of the states of the Union, a railroad as a common car-
rier may not contract against liability for negligence (see Fet-
ter on Carriers, § 398; R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357,
1873; Farnham v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Co., 55 Pa.
State 53, 1867). The doctrine of these cases, like that of the case
under consideration, is primarily, public policy. "Whatever dif-
ference of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of
the public power, and however difficult it may be to render a sat-
isfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does
extend to the protection of the lives, health and property of the
citizen . . . The legislature cannot by any contract divest
itself of the power to provide for these objects. They belong
emphatically to that class of objects which demand the applica-
tion of the maxim, salus populi suprema lex, and are to be
attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the legis-
lative discretion may devise." Beer Co. v. Moss., 97 U. S. 25,
1877. "Whether a contract shall be avoided on the ground of
public policy does not depend upon the question whether it is
beneficial or otherwise to the contracting parties. Their personal
interests have nothing to do with it; but the interest of the public
alone, is to be considered. The state is interested not only in the
welfare, but in the safety of its citizens. To promote these
ends is a leading object in the government. Individuals are
left to make whatever contracts they please, provided no legal or
moral obligation is thereby violated, or any public interest
impaired; but when the effect or tendency of the contract is
to impair such interest, it is contrary to public policy and void."
Smith v. New York Central Railroad Co. (supra).
The power of the state to impose restraints and burdens upon
persons and property in promotion of the public health, good
order and prosperity, is a power always belonging to the states,
not surrendered by them to the general government, and essen-
tially exclusive. By statutory enactment in Iowa it has been
declared to be the public policy of the state that corporations
engaged in railway business in that state cannot, by contract,
free themselves from the liability attaching to them as carriers
of passengers and property; that they are liable to every person,
including their own employes, for injuries resulting from their
neglect; and that such liability, so imposed on the railway com-
panies, cannot be evaded through any contract of insurance, bene-
fit or indemnity entered into prior to the injury complained of.
"In the face of these provisions of the state statutes," says Judge
Shiras, "it is impossible to give any force or validity to the con-
tracts relied on by the defendant in this case. Their clear pur-
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pose is to attempt to free the railway company from the liability
the state has seen fit to impose upon it in the conduct of its busi-
ness in Iowa, and which the state statutes declare cannot be
avoided by contracts entered into in violation of the provisions of
the statutes, and it must be held that the clauses of the contract
which are intended to free the company from liability for inju-
ries caused by the negligence of the company or of its employes
to express messengers, when engaged in their duties upon the
company's trains in Iowa, are invalid."
In accord, see Railroad Go. v. Pontius (supra); Railway Go.
v. Mackey (supra); Railway Co. v. Herrick (supra); Railroad
Co. v. Mathews, 168 TT. S. 7, 1897.
LG.G.F.
